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BOOK REVIEW
SOURCES OF LAW, LEGAL CHANGE AND AMBIGUITY. By Alan,
Watson. Philadelphia:. University of 'Pennsyl.vania Press:, 1,984.
Pp xvii + 164.
Peter G.. Stein*
In his earlier work, The Making of the Civil Law, Professor Watson
argued that laws do not develop to. fit new social and. economic conditions,
nor in response. to political factors,. but they develop' according to their-
particular historical traditions, of which the most important component
is their official sources.. The present work. concentrates on those sources
and finds them singularly wanting..
In Western, societies. the principal sources of law have been, custom,
legislation, juristic opinion, and precedent judicial decisions. The: em-
phasis given to each. of them has varied greatly from, one period, to
another;, but Watson finds generally "'profound- indifference: among', the.
influential members of' the7 legal community who had. some power to,
change the: law as to the quality of these sources and their fitness both,.
for developing law and for clarifying ambiguities" (p,. xii),.. In his, usual:
manner he does it by a series of discrete discussions of the: legal sources
at. particular periods: in ancient Rome; in medieval Germany and, France;.
in Italy, France,. and Scotland in the early modern period; and in
contemporary England. All are: treated: with, the' accuracy and. erudition.
that, we have come to expect. of the author, but in a somewhat grumpy
tone.
His leitmotiv is that the nature and. quality of a: source of law.
affects the- growth of the substantive law and so. he seems irritated that
the. Romans, whom he recognizes as having been creative in finding
satisfactory solutions, to substantive legal, problems, should have shown
so little apparent interest in. the- nature of their mechanisms for making'
new rules. The most fruitful source of law in Rome was juristic opinion,.
an adaptable source, but one in. which "there is no clear way of deciding
when an' opinion is authoritative" (p. 2).. This was particularly so when
the pontifical monopoly of legal interpretation was. broken-, for the
pontiffs" successors gave their opinions as individuals rather than as a
college- A jurist's opinion is authoritative only when: other jurists decide;.
on. the basis of his earlier views, that what he says is worth heeding,..
The imperial attempt to regulate. the situation by giving some jurists
the: right to give opinions "with the emperor's authority" had only
limited effect. In a number of cases, differing juristic views persisted
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and there was no mechanism for resolving the issue, so that the law on that
point remained uncertain, sometimes for centuries.
We are told that statute was "a fairly important source of law
throughout the Republic and the reign of Augustus" (p. 11). On the
other hand, "law making by statute was always rather rare at Rome,"
and why the assemblies made such sparing use of it "remains an unsolved
mystery" (pp. 13-14). Imperial constitutions, particularly rescripts (which
Watson first calls "letters," including subscripts under that head), or
answers to requests for rulings on the law, ran into difficulties with
publication. Little attempt was made to give them much publicity other
than among those making the original request.
The modification of the civil law through the grant of equitable
remedies in the praetor's edict worries Watson. He regards its success
in modifying the law as "indicative of a failure in law making" since
it set up two systems and "there is something pathetic in a iurist like
Gaius setting out rules of civil law and then explaining that they have
been rendered inoperative by the praetor" (p. 22). But just as English
equity was a gloss on the common law and presupposed its existence,
so the scope and limits of praetorian law were dictated by the preexisting
law, and Gaius could hardly have given an adequate description of the
resulting amalgam without explaining the original system and the changes
made in it by the praetor. Watson is presumably criticizing the situation
which the Romans tolerated rather than Gaius himself, but the comment,
which is not an isolated one, suggests that he is judging the situation
from the standpoint of another age, rather than, as he himself says,
"by the conditions of the times."
Chapter II, on medieval Germany and France, is mainly concerned
with custom and its transmission. Although there were many different
customs, there was much borrowing from one to another or "trans-
planting," as Watson prefers to call it. Collections of local custom,
such as the Sachsenspiegel, although undertaken by private initative and
dealing only with a particular region, gained authority in other areas.
This must have been mainly because of ease of access. The phenomenon
can be paralleled in modern times. Much of the law in Botswana today
is customary and there are eight principal tribal groups. When an issue
of tribal customary law comes up, the courts ought to institute an
inquiry into the relevant custom by consulting the elders. In practice,
as I have been informed by a Botswanian lawyer, the courts refer to
the Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom' by Professor I. Schapera,
an anthropologist. He collected his information from only two of the
tribes, but it is more convenient for the courts to assume that the custom
of the others is the same, unless the contrary is proved.
I. 1st ed. 1938; 2d ed. 1955.
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The exponents of medieval German custom were the Schoffen, lay
judges who often exercised jurisdiction over areas other than their own,
through the system of mother and daughter courts. Sometimes the
occasion of sending law to another town provided the impetus for putting
it into some kind of coherent order. Again a modern parallel is available.
The systematic exposition of the common law in the nineteenth century
was encouraged by the need to expound it to Indians, so that curiously
it was India which triggered the importation of German systematic
methods into English law. 2
In his discussion of the French enquire par tourbe, or inquiry into
custom, Watson draws attention to a curious limitation in its value.
This was the argument that a turba, although consisting of at least
ten members, was worth only one witness, since its findings were given
by the mouth of one, and was therefore insufficient under the evidentiary
rule, which properly applied only to findings of fact, that the testimony
of one uncorroborated witness was insufficient. It is this limitation which
may have hastened the process of redaction of the French customs,
which effectively turned them into statutes, but these written costumals
provided no means of finding law when they failed to include a relevant
rule themselves.
In Chapter III we come to the period of the reception of Roman
law, when lawyers became self-conscious about what they were doing.
Here Watson relies much on the analysis of Cardinal De Luca in his
Dottor Volgare of 1673. In the absence of local statute or custom,
judicial decisions of the supreme court of the jurisdiction were binding,
or failing them, decisions of similar jurisdictions. Only after judicial
decisions, moving from the particular to the general, come the texts of
Roman law as interpreted by authoritative commentators, and this even
though they are "popularly" (Watson did not have to translate "il
volgo" as "the mob," who could hardly have had an opinion on such
a recondite point) given priority over decisions. The problem was the
vast number of commentaries which purported to give the ius commune.
Until the seventeenth century little attention had been given to the
confusion caused by the proliferation of such authorities. In effect courts
were free to fix their own forensic customs by following certain au-
thorities in preference to others.
Chapter IV takes us to contemporary English law. The need for
the establishment in 1965 of the Law Commission to consolidate statute
and propose law reform and the formation in 1970 of the Statute Law
Society, point to defects which existed in the making and interpretation
of statute law, and Watson has no difficulty in demonstrating that to
a great extent these defects still persist. He then discusses the advantages
and disadvantages of law making by judicial decision. Though the judge
2. C.H.S. Fifoot, Judge and Jurist in the Reign of Victoria 114 (1959).
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can place the law in its, actual social situation, he is in effect legislating
ex post facto; important issues may not be litigated; the law is unsys-
tematic, "there is no. organizing instrument," and: the judge may be out
of tune with social. realities. The. flexibility claimed for a system based
on- decisions is countered by the: doctrine of binding precedent, partic-
ularly when. the. supreme court regards itself as normally bound by its.
own. decisions. But his main attack is reserved for the unpredictability
of case law resulting from the difficulty of identifying the ratio decidendi
of a case. Both statute and case law are thus inadequate on the ground
of uncertainty.
Chapter V summarizes, the conclusions.. Although for considerable
periods there has been little sustained effort to have satisfactory sources
of law, yet there have been times when lawyers have expressed their
dissatisfaction with them, and their preferred, remedy has. usually been
to demand codification. Justinian in the sixth. century, Francis, Bacon
and Reginald Pole in the sixteenth, and Frederick the Great of Prussia
in the eighteenth all yearned. for clarity,, simplicity, and. certainty of law
through codification. Yet as Watson. sadly notes, "codification once-
complete, law begins to sink back: into complexity and ambiguity" (p.
97). The difficulty is partly the. gap between the general rule stated in
the code and. its application or not to' particular sets of facts. The rules
seem simple but how they should be applied in. a particular case is. not
predictable. There is also a tendency to regard codes as fixed and not
readily changeable.. "The notion of a code, the provisions of which will
be continually under review, seems unacceptable" (p.. 100).. The group
interest and group psychology of both advocates and of judges are
potent factors in maintaining the emphasis on: individual decision-making
and the consequent ambiguity of the: system as. a whole. It is admitted
that. a certain ambiguity "can be fruitful for the eventual development
of good and clear rules" (p. 1.02). The uncertainties may, over time,
produce a better rule than any that would have been laid. down. at the
beginning.. But Watson rightly points to the social and individual costs
of such legal ambiguity, which have been largely ignored.
It is historically true that interest- in improving substantive law is
not reflected in interest in the mechanisms for legal change. But it may
be that those who view the law as something, easy to change: by legislation
deprive it of its continuity with the past and undermine public confidence
in the law as something constant. The ancient Greeks legislated a great
deal but never built up a legal: tradition and never hadi a professional
class of lawyers- who, were- prepared to immerse themselves in its details..
The Romans and. the English traditionally distrusted legislation. and. took
great pains to disguise legal change under the pretense of preserving
existing law; and they were, more successful in developing. the substantive
law.
Watson is clear that today no source of law should have authority
but legislation. His own solution to the problem is "twotier law"
(repeated in Chapter V1 from a earlier published suggestion).. The first
[V¥ol.- 46.
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tier, front-raik law, is set out at the level of generality of -a code and
:it 'is upported by a second rank of 'law., .also legislative 'in form, which
provides an authoritative 'interpretation of .the first. Court decisions 'have
no precedential value. 'Reports of decisions may 'be published, and
.juristic comment is 'to .be encouraged, '.but they have no authority.. A
special interpretative committee of experts keeps the 'law under constant
review and the judges 'have a duty to report to the committee :any -case
which 'they had -to decide, in which the existing law was inadequate.
Thus it 'is "the function of first-rank law -to make law comprehensible,.
of -second-rank law to make law comprehensive, -and of 'the 'interpretative
committee to make the law responsive to what -the community needs
and wants" (p. '116). Various objections -to the proposal 'are 'set out and
answered: the interpretative committee 'is a non-elected undemocratic
body, but its proposals, which primarily concern "lawyer's law," do
not have to be -accepted by the ,legislature; 'its members and the solutions
.they -propose may be -remote from reality and the system -may discourage
innovation by judges and academic scholars, but this need not be 'so..
Despite -the cogency of the argument, however, the :impression is left
that the scheme would not bridge the :gap between rule and case ;and
that 'lawyers would still use past .decisions and juristic comments to
predict the outcome :of cases, whether or not -they 'had 'formal authority.
A proposal, 'strikingly similar to that of Watson, was put forward
for Louisiana in 1823.. In their 'Preliminary Report, primarily drafted
'by 'Edward Livingston, the .Code Commissioners -pointed ,out 'that -in civil
,cases 'the judge ,must somewhere find a rule for every case. The Code
'will deal with as -many cases as can be foreseen, and it 'should then
indicate "'some source to the .Judge from -which 'he is to draw :the rules
for guiding 'his discretion 'in the :others." In England 'this source was
"the .undefined 7and undefinable common law," 'which could ,on occagion
,be "no 'better -source ithan 'his own caprice."' In France, "because the
Great :Code made no :provision on 'this subject," it was "the rubbish
'of :ancient ordinances, local ,customs and 'forgotten edicts," With 'the
'result that "the confusion .of jurisprudence 'from 'which 'it was the intent
of 1the 'Code to r6lieve them"' 'was :reintroduced.
The (Commisgioners 'therefore recommended the repeal of all former
laws and ;in order..
'to govern the 'decisons of the Judge in all ,cases, which cannot
be 'brought 'within The purview ,of ithe 'Code, have _proposed that
he should (determine 'according 'to the dictates -of natural equity,
in the -manner -that "amicable ,compounders" are :now authorized
to decide, but .that such .decisions -shall have no .force as prec-
,edents ;unless sanctioned 'by Legislative 'will. And in order to
'produce .the .expression of 'this Will, and progressively 'to :perfect
.the system, the -Judges are directed .to lay at stated times, before
-the 'General Assembly, 'a circumstantial account of 'every case
for 7the decigion of whidh 'they 'have .thought themselves obliged
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to recur to the use of the discretion thus given; while regular
reports of the ordinary cases of construction, to be made by a
commissioned officer, will enable the Legislative body to explain
ambiguities, supply deficiencies and to correct errors that may
be discovered in the Laws by the test of experience in their
operation.
By these means our Code, although imperfect at first, will
be progressing towards perfection; it will be so formed that
every future amendment may be inserted under its proper head,
so as not to spoil the integrity of the whole; every judicial
decision will throw light on its excellencies or defects. Those
decisions will be the means of improving legislation, but will
not be laws themselves; the departments of government will be
kept within their proper spheres of action.
Nothing seems to have come of Edward Livingston's proposal. Its
time had not yet arrived. I doubt if Watson's proposal will fare any
better.
3. Preliminary Report of the Code Commissioners dated February 13, 1823, in
Louisiana Legal Archives Vol. I xcii-xciii (1937).
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